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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALFRED ROGER MOORE,
Respondent,

vs.
Case No.

THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

8284

Appellant.

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Petition for Rehearing poses the identical questions considered by this court on the appeal. It is not urged
that the court has misconstrued the arguments or has overlooked any of the facts. The same authorities are cited and
the same arguments rehashed. In short, nothing is raised
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by the petition which was not considered on the appeal and
in the opinion of this court.
We set forth herein a concise answer to the renewed
arguments. A more complete answer may be found in the
briefs heretofore filed and in the opinion of the court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
TH . L\.T
.
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT THEY WERE NOT TO
TAI{E INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 12 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY.
POINT III.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 13 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY.
POINT IV.
T'HE CONCURRING JUDGES DID NOT ERR
IN HOLDING THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE INDICATING BIAS AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURORS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT THEY WERE NOT TO
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC.
In their brief petitioner's counsel point out that plaintiff's injury is "nerve root irritation." It is urged that
the court has confused this proposition. From the opinion,
however, it is clear that the court had a complete understanding of the facts. We quote Justice McDonough:
"On the basis of this evidence, plus the history
of pain as given him [the doctor] by respondent,
he concluded that there was a nerve irritation, and
that it was possible that the accident initiated the
condition and, when queried about his opinion as to
what was causing the nerve irritation, he testified:
" 'Again it is a possibility. It is my opinion that this is possibly due to pressure on the
nerve in the lower spine due to irritation from
a disc.'

*

*

*

*

"It is, of course, possible that the jury in assessing the award considered merely the doctor's positive assertion of the existence of a 'nerve irritation,'
but his testimony as to the permanency of disability
was linked to the possibility of a disc injury and a
discussion of disc injuries, including diagrams, occupied a considerable portion of evidence offered
through him, thus impressing the jury with the
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seriousness of such a condition. Under these circumstances, if the proof of such an injury falls
short of that required under our law, then an instruction to that effect should have been given the
jury."
It is manifest from the record that the whole point of
plaintiff's case was to prove a permanent spinal injury
resulting from the accident. His difficulty was that the
doctor he had employed for trial would not testify that
such an injury was probable or likely (R. 65). Instead, he
said "It is just a possible condition (R. 65) ." Since there
was no other evidence in the case indicating a spinal injury this court was required to decide whether the doctor's
testimony was sufficient to support a finding of a disc
lDJUry.

The majority opinion holding that the doctor's testimony was not sufficient evidence follows the decisions of
all other courts which have decided the question including
this court in the case of Chief Consolidated Mining Company v. Salisbury, 6 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929. Mr. Justice
Crockett acknowledges that the rule laid down by the
majority of this court is correct, but reaches a different
conclusion on the issue because he feels the lay testimony
indicated a disc injury. Petitioner, in his brief on rehearing, argues the case from a still different standpoint. He
contends that under the Utah Fuel case the evidence was
sufficient to show nerve irritation and since "No cause [of
the nerve irritation] other than a ruptured disc was suggested by anyone (P. 5)" it must follow that there was
sufficient proof of a disc injury. In other words, the failure
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of the defendant to prove that there was no disc injury is,
in itself, proof of the existence of such an injury.
This same specious argument was made on the appeal
and is fully dealt with at page 7 of our reply brief. Suffice
it to say here that if plaintiff claimed the nerve irritation
was caused by a disc injury he had the burden of proving
it and the only evidence on that point was Dr. Clegg's testimony that such a condition was medically "possible." Counsel fail to grasp that it is at this point of their case that the
Salisbury decision comes into play. With this in mind, it
is obvious that whether or not the jury could find the existence of "nerve irritation" under the Utah Fuel case does
not have any bearing upon the real problem in the lawsuit,
i. e. whether the doctor's testimony was sufficient under
the Salisbury case to show a disc injury.
Petitioner's counsel cite Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 55, for the proposition that the rule preventing recovery where damages are
uncertain does not apply if the fact of damage is certain.
This rule obviously has no application to the instant case
because the question here was whether there was sufficient
proof of a substantial element of damage which the jury
was allowed to consider in assessing damages. The very
fact of the alleged disc injury was in issue. The Story case
may have had some application if it had appeared that the
jury considered only those injuries which were proved and
if the appeal questioned only the certainty of the monetary
amount of damages allowed for such injuries.
The statement that "apparently the majority opinion
holds that causal relation is not a jury question (P. 7)"
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demonstrates a complete failure on counsel's part to understand the opinion for this court did not decide the case on
the question of causal relation-it held that the evidence
was not sufficient to show the existence of the alleged injury. If the evidence had been sufficient to show a disc
injury then the court would have be·en required to decide
whether the evidence warranted a finding that such injury
was caused by the accident.
The Moore decision represents a recognition by the
court that there must be some limit to the weight which may
be given to the speculation and conjecture of doctors. The
opinion affirms sound law in this age where given symptoms may indicate to a medical expert innumerable medically possible conditions some of which, as in the instant
case, cannot even be said to be probable conditions.

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 12 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY.
POINT III.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 13 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY.
The opinion of this court instructs the trial court not
to give instructions 12 and 13 on a retrial. Petitioner's
counsel suggest that this is a "peculiar thing * * *
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[for] the opinion * * * nowhere holds the * * *
instructions to be prejudicial or reversible error (P. 11) ."
There is nothing peculiar or even unusual about the opinion
because there was no occasion to determine whether error
in giving these instructions was prejudicial as the judgment was set aside on other grounds. However, the court
was compelled by its rules to determine whether these instructions were proper. Rule 76 (a) URCP provides:
"If a new trial is granted, the court shall pass
upon and determine a.ll questions of law involved in
the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to
the final determination of the case."
See Z occolillo v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 Pac.
201.
The court correctly decided that the instructions were
improper and should not have been given. The purpose of
instructions is to enlighten the jurors as to the issues and
to assist them in their determination of the facts-not to
inject into the case extraneous matter which can only confuse and perhaps distort deliberations on the operative facts.
The Moore decision simply affirms the rule stated in Parker
v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, 430 to the effect
that:
"* * * it is error for the trial court to give
an instruction, though such an instruction correctly
states the law, on a matter extraneous the issues
and evidence of the case."
Petitioner's counsel are no doubt aware of the fact
that similar instructions have been held not only improper
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but prejudicial. In a recent case, for example, it was held
that an instruction given by a trial court to the effe-ct that
a verdict for personal injuries is not subject to federal
income tax constituted prejudicial error. Wagner V. Illinois
Central Railroad Company, 129 N. E. 2d 771 (Ill. 1955).
See also lrfaus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad
Company-, 128 N. E. 2d 166 (Ohio 1955). Certainly no distinction can be made bet,veen this income tax instruction
and those given in the instant case. We think the instructions were not only erroneous but prejudicial.
Counsel's main argument for the instructions is that
the railroad secured other instructions which in their opinion were similar and consequently equally improper. The
simple answer is that the propriety of the other instructions
referred to was not before the court on this appeal. Even
if such instructions had been questioned on this appeal they
do not fall in the same category as instructions Nos. 12 and
13. The latter instructions not only are wholly unrelated
to the evidence and the issues, but are calculated to divert
the minds of the jurors therefrom to the prejudice of the
defendant. On the other hand, the instruction that railroad
companies are not insurers of the safety of their employees
has a direct bearing on negligence which is always an issue
in F. E. L. A. cases. The sentence containing the word "insurers" is only a part of the instruction defining the duty
of the railroad (R. 292). Likewise the instruction on sympathy does not inject a foreign issue. This instruction was
given by the court on its own motion as a part of the general
instructions (R. 296) and applies to all parties to the suit.
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POINT IV.
T'HE CONCURRING JUDGES DID NOT ERR
IN HOLDING THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE INDICATING BIAS AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURORS.
The evidence relating to this point was painstakingly
briefed on the appeal and the minority opinion demonstrates
a thorough understanding of the facts.
Petitioner's counsel gloss over the facts relating to
Moore's activities after the injury. The record discloses
that counsel's statements are for the most part misleading,
incomplete and incorrect. (See R. 115, 46 re elk hunting;
R. 291-220 re dancing; R. 209, 210, 112 re leave of absence.)
A fair and impartial consideration of all of the evidence concerning l\tloore's alleged injury and of his activities following the accident compel the conclusion reached
by the court.

CONCLUSION
We submit that the issues raised by this petition have
already been carefully considered and have been correctly
decided by this court. It follows that the petition should
be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN c·oTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
Counsel for Appellant.
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